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A B S T R A C T 
 
It has been said that development requires sacrifice. This has been the 
experience of households living in Koto Panjang, Sumatra, Indonesia. Because 
of new dam construction, they have had to move to new settlements provided by 
the government. The displaced community consists of 4868 families from 10 
villages. Many problems have arisen due to this removal. This study examines 
the influence of household participation and compensation on household 
welfare by using a Structural Equation Model. The sample consisted of 360 
household heads from 12 villages in Koto Panjang whose households had been 
moved.  The results show that compensation positively and significantly 
affected household welfare, while household participation could not be proven 
to affect household welfare. 
  
 
 
1.   Introduction  
 
Dam construction causes displacement when 
people have to forcibly move to new resettlement 
locations. The government anticipates involuntary 
resettlement for displaced households by replacing 
the lost land, providing housing, providing access 
to resources and restoring community livelihoods 
(Perera, 2014).  
The purpose of involuntary resettlement is to 
reconstruct people's lives for the better. However, 
previous research indicates that often involuntary 
resettlement tends to negatively impact people's 
lives economically, socially and environmentally. 
Economically, homes, assets and livelihoods are 
lost (Yasuyuki, 1998; Akbar, 2004; JBIC; 2004; 
Wiranata, 2010; Uslaini and Purwanto, 2015). The 
simultaneous loss of assets and livelihoods cause 
households to lose their ability to provide for their 
daily needs, resulting in a decline in welfare. 
Involuntary resettlement generally involves 
households that are not ready to move, are less 
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dynamic, lack the initiative to adapt to new 
environments or are resistant to relocation (ADB, 
1995). Because of this, vulnerable households may 
fail to reconstruct life successfully in new locations. 
In order for households to reconstruct their lives, 
sufficient timely compensation in cash or non-cash 
must be provided (World Bank, 2000).  
Compensation is an urgent requirement to 
improve household welfare. Inadequate 
compensation causes a decline in people's welfare. 
Research has shown that the government's 
promised compensation for the Koto Panjang 
community did not materialize as previously agreed 
(Yasuyuki, 1998; Akbar, 2004; Wiranata, 2010). 
Insufficient compensation for assets and land 
disheartened the people deeply, as their hopes for 
better conditions and wellbeing from the 
compensation did not materialize.  As a result of 
this, the public protested and this culminated in a 
court directive in March 2015 which rejected the 
Koto Panjang community demands as did the 
Japanese court even though the dam was funded 
with Japanese aid money (Uslaini and Purwanto, 
2015). 
Low household participation indicated that the 
resettlement program in Koto Panjang was more 
dominantly determined by the central government. 
The integration and involvement of local 
stakeholders did not go well (Karimi, et al, 2009; 
Uslaini and Purwanto, 2015). This is recognized by 
the government as a mistake, but improvements to 
reform the development paradigm have not yet 
been implemented. The role of local communities 
has not been optimized and their involvement in 
planning and decision making is minimal. The 
government still regard them as a passive object of 
involuntary resettlement, not as active players 
having a greater role in influencing community 
acceptance. 
Compensation and participation are two vital 
factors affecting the welfare of displaced 
households. Therefore, both of these factors were 
examined in the case of households that were 
moved in Koto Panjang. Previous research has not 
studied compensation, participation and welfare 
simultaneously, therefore this study uses a 
Structural Equation Model to find the relationship 
between these three key variables. 
2.  Material and Methods 
 
Improved welfare can be a positive effect of 
resettlement if dam construction leads to a better 
life for the affected community. Welfare was 
measured using the 10 indicators (BPS, 2015); 
health, education, job, household income, family 
harmony, leisure time availability, social 
relationships, house and assets, environment, and 
also security. Two key factors thought to influence 
these are community participation and 
compensation. Community participation consists of 
involving the community in planning, 
implementation, maintenance and resulting 
utilization of the new initiatives (Finsterbusch and 
Wicklyn, 1987). 
Compensation can be in the form of cash 
(money) and non-cash (land, goods and plant).  
(ADB, 1998; Cernea, 2003; Fujikura and 
Nakayama, 2013). 
This study will test the hypothesis that both 
compensation and household participation affect 
household welfare. This hypothesis builds on the 
argument that: 
a. Households will increase their welfare if they 
receive compensation from loss of assets 
owned. Thus compensation is an asset or 
initial resource that settlers have in 
reorganizing their new lives. If the promised 
compensation is in accordance with the wishes 
of the community and paid on time, then it will 
impact on improving household welfare.  
b. Household participation in the involuntary 
resettlement program is urgent to prevent 
potential risks and accommodate household 
interests. Stages of household participation 
consist of program planning, implementation 
and monitoring. If household participation 
goes well and the government initiated 
program accommodates household interests, it 
is believed that the involuntary resettlement 
program will succeed and provide for the 
welfare of the household. 
The simultaneous relationships between 
compensation, participation and welfare are 
pictured in the conceptual framework of Figure 1. 
The path diagram (Figure 2) shows the 
relationships between the variables used in the 
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Structural Equation Model (SEM). There are 5 
latent variables and 30 manifest variable involved 
in the model. The description of variables and 
indicators is presented in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Path Diagram of DAM Involuntary 
Resettlement in Koto Panjang 
 
Table 1. Description of Variables and Indicators 
 
Latent Variable  Code Manifest Indicators 
 
 
 
 
Welfare  
(Kesejahteraan) 
 
K1 Health, 
K2 Education,  
K3 Job,  
K4 Household income, 
K5 Family harmony,  
K6 Leisure time availability,  
K7 Social relation,  
K8 House and asset,  
K9 Environment 
K10 Security. 
Planning 
Participation 
(Partisipasi 
Rencana) 
PR1 No participation 
PR2 Tokenism 
PR3 Tokenism 
PR4 Citizen Power 
PR5 Citizen Power 
Implementation 
Participation 
(Partisipasi 
Pelaksanaan) 
PR1 No participation 
PR2 Tokenism 
PR3 Tokenism 
PR4 Citizen Power 
PR5 Citizen Power 
Monitoring 
Participation 
(Partisipasi 
Monitoring) 
PR1 No participation 
PR2 Tokenism 
PR3 Tokenism 
PR4 Citizen Power 
PR5 Citizen Power 
 
 
Compensation 
(Kompensasi) 
 
C1 Money 
C2 Building Area 
C3 Surface Area 
C4 Farmer Land Area 
C5 Garden Area 
 
Table 2 - Research Location and Total Respondents 
 
No Village HH 
District/City/ 
Province 
1 Pulau Gadang 30 
Kecamatan XIII 
Koto Kampar 
Kabupaten  Kampar 
Provinsi  Riau 
2 Koto Masjid 30 
3 Tanjung Alai 30 
4 Batu Bersurat  30 
5 
Pongkai 
Istiqomah 
30 
6 Koto Tuo   30 
7 Muara Takus 30 
8 Gunung Bungsu 30 
9 Mayang Pongkai  30 
Kecamatan Kampar 
Kiri Tengah 
Kabupaten Kampar 
Provinsi Riau 
10 
Muara Mahat 
Baru 
30 
Kecamatan Tapung 
Kabupaten Kampar  
Provinsi Riau 
11 
Nagari Tanjung 
Balik 
30 
Kecamatan 
Pangkalan Koto Baru 
Kabupaten  50 Kota 
Provinsi Sumatera 
Barat 
12 
Nagari Tanjung 
Pauh 
30 
Total 360   
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3.  Results and Discussions 
 
3.1. Validity Test 
 
To get a fit Structural Equation Model we need 
to test for validity and reliability. Convergent and 
discriminant validity tests were used. The result of 
convergent testing can be seen in the size of the 
loading factors for each manifest variable (Table 3). 
As loading factors for each manifest variable were 
more than 0.5 they can be considered valid and can 
be included in the model. The result of discriminant 
validity test can be seen in Table 4. 
 
Table  3 - Loading Factor for Variable Indicators 
 
Latent variable 
Manifest 
Variable 
Loading 
Factor 
Critical 
Value 
Conclusion 
Planning 
Participation 
PR4 0.9590 0.5 Valid 
PR4 0.9590 0.5 Valid 
PR5 0.6413 0.5 Valid 
Implementatio
n Participation 
PP2 0.7258 0.5 Valid 
PP3 0.8859 0.5 Valid 
Compensation  C4 0.8215 0.5 Valid 
 
 C5 0.8818 0.5 Valid 
Welfare  K5 0.7462 0.5 Valid 
  K7 0.6976 0.5 Valid 
 
 K9 0.7531 0.5 Valid 
K10 0.6699 0.5 Valid 
 
 
Table 4 - AVE and Communality Test 
 
Variable AVE Communality 
Critical 
Value 
Conclusion 
Planning 
Participation 
0.5881 0.5444 0.5 Valid 
Implementation 
Participation 
0.6099 0.6776 0.5 Valid 
Compensation 0.6776 0.6099 0.5 Valid 
Welfare 0.5444 0.5881 0.5 Valid 
 
All variables have an average variance 
extracted (AVE) value and communality value 
greater than 0.5 indicating all construct variables 
are valid according to the communality test. 
 
3.2. Reability Test 
 
Both Composite and Cronbach’s Alpha 
reliability tests were conducted. A group of 
indicators measuring one variable has good 
composite reliability if the value of the 
composite readability is greater than 0.7 and 
the value of Cronbach’s Alpha more than 0.6. 
According to these criteria,  both the composite 
reliability and Cronbach’s Alpha test showed 
that each of the construct variables could be 
considered reliable (Table 5 ). 
 
Tabel 5 - Reability Test 
 
Variable 
Composite 
Reliability 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
Conclusion 
Planning 
Participation 
0.8081 0.6773 Reliable 
Implementation 
Participation 
0.8222 0.7136 Reliable 
Compensation 0.8007 0.6259 Reliable 
Welfare 0.8257 0.7291 Reliable 
 
 
4.  SEM Analysis and Hypothesis Test 
 
These tests of validity and reliability indicate 
that these 12 indicators can be used to model the 4 
constructs with each construct value having 2 to 5 
constituent indicators. Figure 3 shows the direct 
and indirect influence between constructs in the 
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Path Diagram 
 
 
Compensation and active householder 
participation in planning appear to be 
positively correlated with welfare in Koto 
Panjang. However, more rigorous analysis 
shows that the only statistically significant 
influence on household welfare is 
compensation which has a t-statistic >1.6 
(alpha = 10 %). 
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Tabel 6 - Hypothesis Test and Path Coefficients 
(Mean, STDEV, T-Value) 
 
Causality 
Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STERR|) 
Compensati
on -> 
Welfare 
0.253479 0.248658 0.151995 0.151995 1.667678 
Implementati
on -> Welfare 
0.069747 0.039528 0.168265 0.168265 0.414510 
Planning -> 
Welfare 
0.155072 0.136467 0.173134 0.173134 0.895680 
 
The interpretation of this result is if adequate or 
more compensation was received by the community 
it would effectively improve their welfare. This 
observation is based on the results from the field 
showing that the communities receiving adequate 
compensation had better welfare outcomes than 
those who failed to receive adequate compensation. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis that community 
participation influences household welfare was not 
proved in this research. The citizens who were 
moved had no choice but to accept what the 
Government provided. No provision for active 
participation that may have benefited them in the 
relocation process was available. This has also 
often been found to be the case in previous research 
into citizen participation in relocation programs in 
Africa and Thailand and other parts of Indonesia 
where the community is treated as a passive object 
rather than an active stakeholder. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This study has discussed the welfare, 
participation and compensation to communities in 
Koto Panjang that were involuntarily resettled 
because of the effect of dam construction in Koto 
Panjang. The empirical results showed that 
compensation had a significant positive effect on 
the welfare of households while people 
participation had no measurable effect on the 
welfare of households. It showed that provision for 
active household participation was lacking. To 
increase the welfare of displaced communities like 
those in Koto Panjang, the government should 
ensure that compensation is adequate and the 
households are actively involved in the resettlement 
process so that resettlement is conducted in a way 
that impacts the affected households and 
surrounding districts more positively. 
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